Factual Background

The 21-year-old patient died of a cardiac arrest following an asthma attack. Afterward, his parents and estate filed a wrongful death claim in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. The defendants were a paramedic and an EMT. They responded to the 911 call for the patient, and their employer, Baltimore County, was also a defendant. The circuit subsequently granted the defense motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs filed an appeal. (Op. at 1). 

The defendants, the paramedic and EMT, argued that they were entitled to paramedic immunity under CJP 5-603 (the Good Samaritan Act) and CJP 5-604 (Fire & Rescue Companies Act). Baltimore County also argued for governmental immunity under CJP 5-301. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, contended that there was sufficient evidence of gross negligence. Also, the defendants’ policies and customs, which they argued were not in line with standard emergency medical procedures, prevented them from receiving immunity.

The plaintiffs then responded that there was sufficient evidence of gross negligence and that the defendant’s policies and customs, which they argued were not in line with standard emergency medical procedures, kept them from receiving immunity. (Id.).

CSA

The Court of Special Appeals adopted the opinion of the circuit court. (Id. at 2). The CSA rejected the plaintiffs’ assertion that the defendants were willful and grossly negligent in their pre-arrival and post-arrival and were not entitled to paramedic immunity. Paramedic immunity, as provided under the Good Samaritan Act and the Fire & Rescue Companies Act, protects emergency responders from liability when giving care in good faith. The courts found the evidence did not establish willful or grossly negligent conduct. (Id. at 9-10, 11). As a result, the responders were to receive paramedic immunity based on the Good Samaritan Act and the Fire & Rescue Companies Act and to judgment as a matter of law (Id.).

The courts also found that the plaintiffs were required to have a medical expert to establish causation, but they did not have one. (Id. at 12).

Appellate Court on County Immunity

The plaintiffs also brought a claim against Baltimore County, the employer of the paramedic and EMT. They argued that the patient’s constitutional rights “were violated as a direct result of Baltimore County policies and customs which contributed to the deprivation of Mr. Coit’s federal constitutional or statutory rights to life” (Id. at 13).

The plaintiffs argued that a lack of a delayed response policy would require emergency medical service providers to notify a dispatcher if there will be a delay in responding to an emergency. Afterward, Baltimore County responded that it is entitled to immunity. (Id.). The person seeking emergency assistance could then make a decision regarding their course of action based on that information. (Id.).

The courts concluded: “There is no legal or factual basis for a direct claim against Baltimore County” (Id.). Firstly, there was no evidence of a delayed response. There was also no evidence that a delayed response policy would have provided a better outcome for the patient (Id.).

Commentary by the Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer on County Immunity

The courts recognized that a plaintiff can bring suits against a county under 42 USC 1983 for violating federal constitutional or statutory rights. (Id.). However, the courts’ opinions do not tell us whether the plaintiffs ever identified the “federal constitutional or statutory rights to life” upon which they based their claims against Baltimore County.

We also cannot tell from the courts’ opinions where the plaintiffs got their delayed-response policy theory. There is no indication that it came from a court case that has upheld liability based on such a policy.

The courts did not expend much analysis in rejecting liability based on county immunity. The three Blog posts on this case make it apparent that the plaintiffs did not come close to satisfying their burden on the three issues involved.

It is unclear why the court decided to publish this opinion. In addition, I’m not sure what the experienced practitioner gains from the case. Based on the prior Maryland cases asserting claims against paramedics, the fact pattern described by the court had no chance of prevailing. It did not matter how it was couched or presented.

Mark Kopec is a top-rated Baltimore medical malpractice lawyer. Contact us at 800-604-0704 to speak directly with Attorney Kopec in a free consultation. The Kopec Law Firm is in Baltimore and helps clients throughout Maryland and Washington, D.C. Thank you for reading the Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer Blog.

Factual Background

The 21 year old patient died of a cardiac arrest following an asthma attack. Afterward, his parents and estate filed a wrongful death claim in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. The defendants were a paramedic and EMT. They responded to the 911 call for the patient. An additional defendant was their employer, Baltimore County. The circuit court subsequently granted the defense motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs filed an appeal. (Op. at 1). 

The paramedic & EMT argued that they were to receive paramedic immunity under CJP 5-603 (the Good Samaritan Act) and CJP 5-604 (Fire & Rescue Companies Act). In addition, Baltimore County argued it was to receive governmental immunity under CJP 5-301. The defendants further claimed contributory negligence by the patient and insufficient evidence of negligence. (Id. at 4).

The plaintiffs then responded that there was sufficient evidence of gross negligence and the defendants’ policies and customs kept them from receiving immunity. (Id.).

Appellate Court on Paramedic Immunity

The Court of Special Appeals adopted the opinion of the circuit court. (Id. at 2). The circuit court noted the Maryland definition of gross negligence is:

[G]ross negligence is an intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in reckless disregard of the consequences as affecting the life or property of another and also implies a thoughtless disregard of the consequences without the exertion of any effort to avoid them. (Id. at 6).

The plaintiffs asserted that the defendants were willful and grossly negligent in their pre-arrival and post-arrival and were not entitled to paramedic immunity. In the pre-arrival, the plaintiffs focused on the delayed response time, incorrect information to dispatch, and lack of urgency on arrival. The post-arrival allegations center on the assessment and treatment. (Id. at 8).

Evidence

The courts found that the evidence did not establish willful or grossly negligent pre-arrival conduct. The ambulance arrived less than seven minutes after the call for service. The responders’ failure to run from the ambulance to the patient was not negligent; it was specifically for the safety of the responders. (Id. at 9-10).

The courts also found that the evidence did not establish willful or grossly negligent conduct post-arrival, and paramedic immunity applied. The responders promptly assessed and treated the patient:

“They checked for a pulse, observed agonal respirations, placed an oxygen mask on Mr. Coit, prepared an intravenous line and began administering fluids, began transcutaneous cardiac pacing to address Mr. Coit’s heart rate, administered Narcan, and administered Atropine. Treatment and assessment of Mr. Coit’s condition continued after Mr. Coit was removed from the house and taken to the medic unit for transport to Northwest Hospital. He was intubated with an endotracheal intubation tube. Further assessment resulted in noting the absence of mechanical capture with transcutaneous pacing and agonal electrical rate without a pulse. Emergency medical service providers began administering CPR and administered Epinephrine during transport to Northwest Hospital. Upon arrival at Northwest Hospital, Paramedic Nappi reported to emergency department personnel regarding what treatment had been provided and the status of Mr. Coit’s condition.” (Id. at 10).

The plaintiffs claimed Narcan not needed because there was no indication that the patient was experiencing an opioid overdose. However, Narcan causes no harm. (Id. at 11). 

As a result, the responders were to receive paramedic immunity based on the Good Samaritan Act and the Fire & Rescue Companies Act and to judgment as a matter of law (Id.).

Commentary by the Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer on Paramedic Immunity

Past Maryland cases demonstrate how difficult it is to meet the willful conduct and gross negligence standard in cases against ambulance crews. You can read more generally about this in this Blog’s post on the case of Stracke v. Butler.

This Coit case does not come close to meeting the evidentiary standard to avoid paramedic immunity. The plaintiffs’ case seems to be based mostly on their perception and belief that the responders were not hurrying in their response and treatment of the patient. The case also included a complaint of unnecessary Narcan that caused no harm. Consequently, the defense’s summary judgment was predictable.

In part 2 of the post, I will address the issue of causation that the courts discussed.

Mark Kopec is a top-rated Baltimore medical malpractice lawyer. Contact us at 800-604-0704 to speak directly with Attorney Kopec in a free consultation. The Kopec Law Firm is in Baltimore and helps clients throughout Maryland and Washington, D.C. Thank you for reading the Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer Blog.

Facts on Reporter Immunity

The Plaintiff, Ms. Monroe, had two daughters, ages 5 and 6, who had flu symptoms. She gave them several brands of over-the-counter cough medicine over a few days. (Op. at 4, 6). Ms. Monroe called 911 to report that her children, half-sisters, were unconscious and barely breathing. Afterward, an ambulance took them to UMMC. (Id. at 1).

At the emergency room, the staff administered a battery of tests, including VITROS rapid urine tests. That test came back positive for opiates in both children. The staff treated them for acute respiratory failure, intubated them, and they remained in comas and on ventilators for several days. (Id. at 1).

Ms. Monroe told the UMMC toxicologist, Dr. Kim, about giving the kids several brands of OTC medications for flu symptoms. She theorized they were to blame for the kids’ condition. Dr. Kim noted in his records that he disagreed and that there are no known false positives of opiates due to DXM, the active ingredient in the OTC medications. (Id. at 6-8).

The police notified the Department of Social Services (DSS), and the reporter immunity issue arose when the doctors shared the results of the VITROS. UMMC then received blood test results, which were negative for opiates. UMMC promptly notified DSS. The hospital discharged the kids after 11 days, but they would not go home to their mother for four months. The court system removed the children from Ms. Monroe. Still, ultimately, the court adjudicated the children not to be children in need of assistance (CINA). The children made a full medical recovery. (Id. at 1-2). However, tragically, three years later, the older daughter died by suicide. (Id. at 2). 

Lawsuit

The mother and her kids brought suit against UMMC, the emergency physicians’ group, and toxicologist Dr. Kim in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Plaintiffs alleged that Dr. Kim started rumors that the kids had overdosed on opiates, instigating DSS to open investigations and driving official proceedings in the face of contradictory evidence. (Id. at 2, 7).

The plaintiffs’ claims included intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), false imprisonment, intentional misrepresentation, constructive fraud, and malicious prosecution. They asserted that family members who worked at UMMC said that Dr. Kim spread rumors to persons not involved in the treatment that the mother permitted her children to gain access to opiates and that she was a child abuser.  The plaintiffs also alleged that Dr. Kim told social services that the urine test was more accurate than the blood test. They allege Dr. Kim acted maliciously and reported the VITROS results in bad faith. (Id. at 12-13).

The defendants sought summary judgment on reporter immunity.

Appellate Court on Reporter Immunity

The Appellate Court of Maryland first looked at the initial denial of summary judgment on statutory immunity early in the case. The defense contended that they were entitled to summary judgment under CJP 5-620 and FL 5-708 as persons who, in good faith, make a report of abuse or neglect of a child.

The Appellate Court has defined good faith in the reporter immunity law: “An intangible and abstract quality that encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice, and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage.” Catterton v. Coale, 84 Md. App. 337, 342 (1990). Bad faith means “not simply bad judgment or negligence, but it implies a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and a conscious doing of wrong.” (Id.).

In addition, courts have held that the law does not require the reporter to make an independent investigation to determine whether there is exculpatory evidence (Op. at 83).

The Appellate Court examined whether there was a genuine dispute about whether the defendants acted in good faith. The court noted that the plaintiffs had expert testimony challenging Dr. Kim’s reliance on the VITROS testing.  They also alleged that racial and economic animus drove the defendants’ actions. The court also observed that the American Medical Association (AMA) has acknowledged that many patients suffer discrimination when receiving health care. (Id. at 81).

The circuit court found the mother’s testimony that the defendants were disregarding her views and treating her disrespectfully compelling. The Appellate Court stated that it rarely overturns a denial of a motion for summary judgment where good faith is the issue and would not do so here (Id. at 92).

Commentary by the Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer on Reporter Immunity

In this case, the Appellate Court’s holdings reflect the plaintiffs’ challenges, particularly in proving a lack of good faith and scientific matters. We must view the Appellate Court’s upholding of the denial of summary judgment in the context of the deferential abuse of discretion standard, which “rarely” results in reversal for denial of summary judgment. Similarly, the circuit court denied summary judgment on the issue of good faith in reporter immunity, where it is “ordinarily” not a matter for summary judgment. Examination of the evidence shows how, when viewed individually, there can be alternative explanations. Still, together, it can form a picture that overcomes summary judgment.

Evidence

AMA report on discrimination in medical care. Such conduct is unacceptable. This report shows that racial discrimination occurs in these situations but does not establish it happened here.

Plaintiff’s Expert: The plaintiffs had an expert toxicologist who opined that Dr. Kim was wrong when he said that cough syrup could not cause a false positive for opiates. The law is clear that being wrong alone does not constitute bad faith. This evidence can support a lack of good faith but can also exist without it.

Dr. Kim’s Involvement in the Investigation: Plaintiffs alleged that Dr. Kim was the “driving” force behind the DSS investigation. The evidence, however, can also be viewed as involving no unusual involvement by Dr. Kim.

The plaintiffs alleged that UMMC employees told the mother that UMMC was spreading rumors about her. The Court’s opinion does not reveal the plaintiffs producing any such evidence.

The circuit court found compelling evidence that the defendants disregarded Ms. Monroe’s views and treated her disrespectfully. This finding is important because the circuit court assesses the witnesses in person. It can certainly support a finding of lack of good faith. However, this mistreatment can also be unacceptable conduct that does not equate with dishonesty.

Dr. Kim’s Reporter Immunity

Interaction between Dr. Kim and Ms. Monroe. Ms. Monroe once spoke with Dr. Kim but did not recall the conversation. She said Dr. Kim said that typically when you see cases like this, there is a positive blood sample from whatever drug your children ingested. Dr. Kim further stated that they would do a drug panel, and one of the drugs would come up positive. Mrs. Monroe then questioned, a typical case for who? (Id. at 18).

Mrs. Monroe further attributed her racial claims to “the entire University of Maryland staff” because they did not listen to her explanation of the OTC medications and only focused on illegal drugs. She felt the University of Maryland saw her as a black woman from her neighborhood. There were also looks and stares. (Id. at 19).

Ms. Monroe also attributed a racial comment to an unidentified white UMMC employee who said two black children with two different fathers would not have a specific metabolism disorder, which was not prominent in blacks but is in whites and Asians. (Id. at 19-20).

The “typical” comment and metabolism comment can be motivated by racial and economic discrimination or have completely innocuous explanations. The other evidence could indicate racial animus or be Ms. Monroe’s subjective interpretation.

Conclusion

Proving a lack of good faith based on racial and economic discrimination can be challenging. Defendants rarely document discriminatory intent. In this case, there were factors that, each alone, could have innocuous explanations. However, together the courts found that the factors supported a finding of lack of good faith for reporter immunity that resulted in denial of summary judgment.

This is a close question that jurists can disagree on. For example, one member of the Appellate Court panel wrote a concurring opinion in which he stated that the standard of review was de novo, not abuse of discretion. In writing that he would have granted summary judgment, he stated: “Unsupported allegations of racial and economic animus and assertions that Dr. Kim could have second guessed the VITROS test result are insufficient to create a question of fact as to the good faith of the mandatory reporter.” (Conc. Op. at 2).

Spoiler alert:  In a later blog post on this case opinion, I will discuss how the result changed when the court removed one of these pieces (Plaintiff’s expert) from the picture.

Additional Reads

In part 2 of the Blog series on Monroe v. UMMC, you can read about the court’s analysis of late motions to compel.

For a discussion of healthcare provider immunity in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, see this Blog’s post in Constantine v. BWEP.

Mark Kopec is a top-rated Baltimore medical malpractice lawyer. Contact us at 800-604-0704 to speak directly with Attorney Kopec in a free consultation. The Kopec Law Firm is in Baltimore and helps clients throughout Maryland and Washington, D.C. Thank you for reading the Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer Blog.

Facts

The plaintiff went to the BWMC emergency room in 2020 at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. The first visit was on April 22, and then the second was on April 25. On April 22, the plaintiff reported fever, muscle aches, chills, nausea, mild cough, and diarrhea. She also said a lot of people at her work were sick and suspected to have COVID. The ER staff suspected she had COVID but did not test her because she did not meet the testing criteria in effect at the time. (Op. at 1).

On April 25, the plaintiff returned by ambulance with knee and back pain, sweat, chills, and cough. Specifically, her knee pain was increasing. The ER staff diagnosed her with suspected COVID and knee effusion. It discharged her, instructing her to return if she had difficulty breathing.

On April 30, she went to another ER and was diagnosed to be septic, have Group A strep., and suspected endocarditis. She did not test positive for COVID (Id.).

The plaintiff sued the BWMC emergency physicians in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. The defense moved for summary judgment based on statutory immunity under PS 14-3A-06., which the circuit court granted (Id. at 2).

The plaintiff’s complaint alleges that she had a markedly elevated white blood cell count, including elevated bands indicating a more severe infection. (Id.).

Statutory Immunity

On March 5, 2020, the Maryland governor declared a state of emergency due to COVID-19. Subsequently, he issued executive orders under that declaration. On May 6, the governor issued a proclamation stating:

“Health care providers who act in good faith under this catastrophic health emergency proclamation, including orders issued under the proclamation by the Governor and by other State officials acting at the direction of or under delegated authority from the Governor, have the immunity provided by §14-3A-06 of the Public Safety Article of the Maryland Code.”

A May 6 directive from the MD Health Department stated: “MDH does not construe the immunity provisions in Pub. Safety Art. § 14-3A06 or Health Gen. Art. § 18-907 to apply to a healthcare provider or facility performing non-COVID-19 related procedures or appointments.”

Under PS 14-3A-06, “[a] health care provider is immune from civil or criminal liability if the health care provider acts in good faith and under a catastrophic health emergency proclamation.” 

Appellate Court’s Analysis of Statutory Immunity

The Appellate Court found that the governor’s March 5 proclamation triggered this application of statutory immunity. The Appellate Court observed no allegation of failure to act in good faith. As a result, the question is what does it mean to act “under” the proclamation. (Op. at 8-9).

The Court found that the ER physicians had provided COVID-related care even though they had not provided the care allegedly needed for another infection process in the knee (Id. at 11). As a result, the Appellate Court found that the care was “sufficiently related” to the emergency proclamation to be entitled to statutory immunity under PS 14-3A-06 (Id. at 11-12).

The Court held that the May 6 directive did not apply because the official issued it after the care (Id. at 11-13). The Court also noted that other factual scenarios may raise various issues relating to statutory immunity.

Commentary By the Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer

This commentary is more related to the nature of the statutory immunity than the Court’s interpretation.

Officials’ Response to COVID

Many of the decisions that government officials made during COVID were questionable. They include expansive lockdowns, frequently changing (and sometimes inconsistent) directives on mask mandates, “physical distancing,” limits on gathering sizes, quarantine requirements, and testing guidelines. Officials had to make many decisions without all of the information they would have liked about COVID, including its contagiousness and prospects for treatment. Despite this limitation, however, there is ample evidence that many decisions could have been more wise regardless of the state of knowledge.

Some of the difficulties with the policy decisions are the inevitable challenges that “one size fits all” rules always present. These same challenges apply to healthcare provider statutory immunity. Perhaps more importantly, however, statutory immunity is arguably unnecessary to accomplish its goals.

Maryland’s Standard of Care is Sufficient

Suppose the immunity is to protect healthcare workers in a public emergency. In that case, the medical malpractice system already does that. In Maryland, the standard of care for healthcare workers is the standard of practice among members of the same healthcare profession, with similar training and experience, situated in the same or similar communities at the time of the alleged malpractice. CJP 3-2A-02(c)(1).

Two components apply to this discussion: “standard of practice . .. at the time of the alleged malpractice.” Any medical malpractice case related to care provided during a public health emergency would use a standard of care that reflects the circumstances of the emergency. In this public health situation, that would include the knowledge at the time about COVID and its testing and treatment.

Because of this standard, some aspects of COVID cases make them unviable as medical malpractice cases. Throughout the COVID pandemic, I spoke to many potential clients who had bad outcomes from COVID-19. I did not see a possible medical malpractice case in nearly all of those instances. The reason was usually the lack of any proven treatment and the unpredictability of the outcomes. There often was no pattern. Some young and otherwise healthy patients died or had permanent complications, and some older, health-compromised patients made complete recoveries.

Consequences of Statutory Immunity

Constantine, however, was not a COVID case. It was a suspected COVID case. Other facts indicated an unrelated, serious infection process. These options are the essence of differential diagnosis. The health care providers got it wrong.

Statutory immunity has given the healthcare providers an automatic pass at the expense of the plaintiff’s permanent loss. The medical malpractice system, however, was equipped to weigh the healthcare provider’s actions according to the appropriate standard to determine whether the plaintiff was entitled to compensation. 

As the Appellate Court recognized, it is unknown how many other plaintiffs will be denied the protection of the justice system under statutory immunity.

Mark Kopec is a top-rated Baltimore medical malpractice lawyer. Contact us at 800-604-0704 to speak directly with Attorney Kopec in a free consultation. The Kopec Law Firm is in Baltimore and helps clients throughout Maryland and Washington, D.C. Thank you for reading the Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer Blog.

A case is possible, but the law on these claims differs significantly from the law that applies to doctors. Below, I discuss the legal standard and a case using it, then provide a commentary for Maryland medical malpractice lawyers.

Suing Ambulance EMTs: Gross Negligence

Instead of an ordinary negligence standard, the standard for these claims in Maryland is gross negligence. Section 5-604(a) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings part of the Maryland Code provides:

“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, except for any willful or grossly negligent act, a fire company or rescue company, and the personnel of a fire company or rescue company, are immune from civil liability for any act or omission in the course of performing their duties.”

Application: Stracke v. Butler

In Stracke v. Butler (August 16, 2019), the Court of Appeals of Maryland issued a reported opinion applying this gross negligence standard. Mrs. Butler called 911, saying that her husband was having chest pains, and an ambulance arrived. At trial, the parties told different versions of the EMTs’ actions in treating Mr. Butler. The EMTs ended up taking Mr. Butler to a nearby hospital. While he was waiting in the emergency room, he had a fatal heart attack.

The plaintiffs sued the ambulance EMTs and argued that the EMTs were grossly negligent in failing to respond to Mr. Butler’s symptoms. The Court explained the difference between the legal standards: 

Ordinary, simple negligence is “any conduct, except conduct recklessly disregardful of an interest of others, which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm.” On the other hand, this Court has explained that “gross negligence is an intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in reckless disregard of the consequences as affecting the life or property of another, and also implies a thoughtless disregard of the consequences without the exertion of any effort to avoid them.” We have made clear that a claim for gross negligence “sets the evidentiary hurdle at a higher elevation.” (Op. at 11).

The Court also explained gross negligence applicable to suing ambulance EMTs this way:

Gross negligence is not just big negligence. For these purposes, gross negligence “must be sufficient . . . to establish that the defendant . . . had a wanton or reckless disregard for human life . . . . Only conduct that is of extraordinary or outrageous character will be sufficient to imply this state of mind.” (Id.)

Court’s Analysis

In reviewing the evidence before it, the Court found that the evidence failed to establish gross negligence. There was insufficient evidence to conclude that the EMTs made a deliberate and conscious choice not to help Mr. Butler survive. They responded to the call, provided Mr. Butler with immediate attention and treatment, and transported him to the nearest hospital in under 10 minutes. Even though the paramedics failed to follow procedures and protocols, that was not enough. They did not knowingly, consciously, and deliberately do so. The evidence did not indicate that the ambulance crew had a wanton and reckless disregard for Mr. Butler’s life, nor did they present an utter indifference to his rights and well-being. (Id. at 12-13, 16-18).

The Stracke decision was 4-3, and three judges determined that the jury could find gross negligence. The dissent wrote, “If what the defendants did and failed to do does not arise to gross negligence, what would?” (Dissent at 23 fn. 10).

Commentary By the Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer

Where Does Stracke Leave Us?

What can Maryland medical malpractice lawyers do when suing ambulance EMTs under Stracke? The dissent’s question is a good one. If Stracke wasn’t gross negligence, what is?

Several situations are probably not gross negligence. Suppose paramedics attempt to treat the patient but make a misdiagnosis. Also, they may fail to give the correct treatment or provide the wrong treatment. Even if there are multiple instances of failing to comply with professional standards, it is probably not gross negligence.

What would be “reckless disregard” for the patient’s life? The Stracke Court found that “there was not sufficient evidence to conclude that the EMTs made a deliberate and conscious choice to not help Mr. Butler survive.” (Op. at 13.) Under this language, a deliberate choice not to help a patient may qualify. Presumably, the deliberate choice has to have no basis. For example, suppose the EMTs decide not to treat the patient. Their decision is because it would require them to enter into a life-threatening situation. In that case, it is hard to see how that would meet the standard.

As long as Stracke remains the law, Maryland medical malpractice lawyers will face challenging circumstances when suing ambulance EMTs.

Mark Kopec is a top-rated Baltimore medical malpractice lawyer. Contact us at 800-604-0704 to speak directly with Attorney Kopec in a free consultation. The Kopec Law Firm is in Baltimore and helps clients throughout Maryland and Washington, D.C. Thank you for reading the Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer Blog.