Factual Background on Enforceable Settlement

This dispute originated from a property disagreement between two adjacent landowner groups. The neighboring properties shared access issues involving a narrow driveway as well as utility lines. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit seeking a judicial declaration of ownership over the driveway area and an adjacent strip of land used for sewer and water access. The plaintiff also sought an injunction to stop construction on the adjacent lot, along with financial damages.

The defendant responded by asserting ownership under existing property declarations. The defendant also argued that municipal authorities had approved the necessary permits for construction.

The trial began in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. After the opening statements and the testimony of the first witness, the parties paused to negotiate. Counsel then returned to the courtroom and reported that the parties had reached a resolution. Counsel read the full settlement terms directly onto the record. The issue became whether there was an enforceable settlement.

The agreement reallocated fee simple ownership of the disputed strips of land between the parties. It provided for a new shared driveway easement and a joint maintenance agreement. The agreement required the installation of safety features, such as a speed bump, a mirror, and an alarm. It also included mutual releases of all claims, a waiver of objections to future construction permits, and a mutual non-disparagement clause.

Although the parties agreed to reduce their agreement to writing, they failed to sign a formal contract. The defendant filed a motion to enforce the oral agreement. The plaintiff hired new counsel and opposed enforcement, arguing that the oral agreement lacked mutual assent, omitted essential terms, and resulted from fraud or pressure. The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing and granted the motion to enforce the settlement. The plaintiff then appealed.

Parties’ Arguments

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in finding an enforceable settlement from the oral agreement. The plaintiff claimed that the courtroom statement was merely a preliminary step. The plaintiff asserted that the parties intended a binding agreement only after executing a final written document. Additionally, the plaintiff identified several terms that remained unresolved, such as the exact details of the maintenance agreement and the specific speed bump placement. The plaintiff also claimed a lack of understanding due to language difficulties and alleged misrepresentations by prior counsel.

The defendant argued that the trial court correctly enforced the contract. It asserted that both sides clearly demonstrated an intent to be bound when reading the terms into the record. The defendant emphasized that the parties defined all essential material terms on the record. The defendant argued that drafting a formal document was simply a final administrative step rather than a condition precedent.

Court’s Ruling

The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court’s finding of an enforceable settlement agreement. The court analyzed settlement agreements under standard principles of contract law. It applied established legal factors to evaluate whether the parties intended to be bound and whether the terms were sufficiently definite.

The appellate court held that placing the settlement on the record during an active trial strongly indicates a binding intent. Both parties were present, represented by counsel, and voiced no objections when the terms were stated in open court. The court rejected claims of coercion, misrepresentation, or language barriers, noting that the trial record lacked evidence supporting those assertions.

Furthermore, the court ruled that all material terms were sufficiently clear. The core elements of the compromise—property ownership reallocation, shared driveway access, and mutual releases—were clearly outlined. The court explained that minor administrative details do not render an agreement unenforceable. A settlement is binding if the parties agree on essential terms, even if minor details are left for future written documentation.

Commentary by Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer Mark Kopec on Enforceable Settlement

This decision offers practical guidance for trial lawyers handling settlement negotiations in civil litigation. Reaching a settlement at the courthouse steps is common, but attorneys can ensure that the agreement holds up under judicial review.

First, place the complete terms on the record with precision. When reading a settlement into the court transcript, state every material term explicitly. Mention the release of claims, payment schedules, indemnity clauses, and confidentiality or non-disparagement provisions. Do not leave core obligations for future discussion.

Second, confirm your client’s consent on the record. After reading the terms, ask your client questions in open court. Confirm that the client heard the terms, understands them, and agrees to be bound by them. This step prevents future claims of coercion, buyer’s remorse, or communication failures.

Third, clarify whether a subsequent written document is a requirement or a mere formality. If the parties intend for the oral agreement to be immediately binding as an enforceable settlement, state that the written contract will simply memorialize the agreement. If you intend not to be bound until signing a formal document, state that condition clearly on the record.

Finally, distinguish material terms from minor administrative details. Ensure that negotiations finalize key compromise elements. Leaving essential terms open creates a risk that courts will find no meeting of the minds. Careful preparation during negotiations protects the client and secures a final, binding resolution.

You can read other Blog posts on issues involving settlement, including Enforcing Settlement: Kolbe v. McKnew.

Mark Kopec is a top-rated Baltimore medical malpractice lawyer. Contact us at 800-604-0704 to speak directly with Attorney Kopec in a free consultation. The Kopec Law Firm is in Baltimore and helps clients throughout Maryland and Washington, D.C. Thank you for reading the Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer Blog.

Medical malpractice litigation often involves multiple parties, insurance coverage, and high-stakes financial exposure. When plaintiffs sue several medical providers, pre-trial settlement negotiations become a central tactical battleground. When there is a settlement by one party in a medical malpractice case, issues of contribution can arise.

A frequent challenge arises when one defendant settles before trial using a pro rata release while other defendants choose to litigate. How does that settlement affect the non-settling defendants? Specifically, does a standard pro rata release protect a settling party from a subsequent contribution lawsuit by non-settling co-defendants?

The court provided guidance on the Maryland Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tort-Feasors Act (UCATA). It explained what is necessary to extinguish contribution liability. It also outlined how parties must address contribution claims following a pre-trial settlement.

Factual and Procedural Background on Contribution in Medical Malpractice

The litigation originated from a medical malpractice lawsuit filed by plaintiffs against:

• Hospital (along with several of its nurses)
• Doctor and his medical practice entities

Before trial, the plaintiffs reached a confidential settlement agreement with the hospital. In exchange for a financial payment, the plaintiffs then executed a release and voluntarily dismissed the hospital from the lawsuit.

The Terms of the “Swigert” Release

The settlement agreement explicitly stated that the hospital did not admit liability. Instead, the agreement referenced a conditional pro rata mechanism under the principle established in Swigert v. Welk:

1. Conditional Reduction: The plaintiffs agreed that their recoverable damages against remaining defendants (such as doctor) reduce by the hospital’s pro rata share only if there was a subsequent adjudication of joint tort-feasor for the hospital.
2. Indemnification & Escrow: The plaintiffs further agreed to indemnify the hospital against future contribution claims asserted by the doctor. They also agreed to hold half of any judgment recovered against the doctor in escrow as security.

The Trial Verdict and Post-Trial Litigation – Contribution in Medical Malpractice

Following the hospital’s dismissal, the case proceeded to trial against the doctor alone. The jury returned a verdict exceeding $8 million for the plaintiffs. The trial court later reduced this verdict under Maryland’s statutory cap on non-economic damages to $2,186,342.50. The doctor satisfied the judgment in full.

Because the medical malpractice trial had never determined the hospital’s liability, the doctor subsequently filed a separate lawsuit against the hospital seeking statutory contribution.

Contemporaneously, the plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action against the doctor. They argued that the pre-trial release extinguished the hospital’s liability and that the doctor waived his rights by failing to file a cross-claim in the original medical malpractice action.

The trial court issued conflicting rulings in the two actions. The Court of Special Appeals consolidated the cases, and the Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari to resolve the statutory interpretation.

Key Legal Holdings of the Court on Contribution in Medical Malpractice

The court affirmed that the doctor could pursue a separate contribution action against the hospital.

The court established three primary holdings regarding the Maryland UCATA:

1. Conditional Releases Do Not Automatically Extinguish Contribution in Medical Malpractice

Under Section 3-1405 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, a release extinguishes a settling party’s contribution liability to other joint tort-feasors only if it provides for an absolute pro rata reduction of the plaintiff’s damages.

The court ruled that a release that conditions the pro rata reduction on a future judicial finding of liability does not satisfy Section 3-1405 unless that finding actually occurs or the settling party explicitly admits joint tort-feasor status in the release. Because the hospital never admitted liability and was dismissed before trial without an adjudication, its contribution liability was not extinguished.

2. A Non-Settling Defendant May Pursue Contribution in a Separate Action

The court held that Maryland law does not require a non-settling co-defendant to file a cross-claim or implead a settling party in the initial lawsuit.

Neither Section 3-1405 nor the Maryland Rules (including Rule 2-332 and Rule 2-614) mandate that contribution claims resolve within the primary action. A non-settling defendant who pays more than their pro rata share retains the statutory right to bring an independent action for contribution.

3. Non-Settling Defendants Do Not Waive Contribution Rights

The doctor did not waive his statutory contribution rights by choosing not to assert “release” as an affirmative defense under Rule 2-323(g)(12) during the medical malpractice trial.

Because the doctor’s right to contribution was created by statute rather than derived as a third-party beneficiary of the private settlement agreement, he was not obligated to plead the release in the underlying action.

Commentary by Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer Mark Kopec on Contribution in Medical Malpractice

This opinion offers lessons for plaintiffs, settling co-defendants, and non-settling tort-feasors.

Because a conditional release leaves contribution liability open unless tort-feasor status is resolved, legal counsel must carefully evaluate their settlement strategies.

Pre-Trial Settlement Decision Framework

When drafting or evaluating a pre-trial settlement under the Maryland UCATA, the legal analysis moves through a set of decision points:

• Is Joint Tort-Feasor Status Expressly Admitted in the Release?
  • YES: Contribution is Extinguished. The non-settling party’s potential judgment is automatically reduced pro rata.
  • NO: The agreement is a Conditional “Swigert” Release. It requires a subsequent adjudication of joint tort-feasor status to trigger any pro rata reduction.
• If Conditional, Was the Settling Party’s Status Adjudicated in the Underlying Trial?
  • YES: Contribution Extinguished. The pro rata credit applies to reduce the verdict.
  • NO: Contribution Not Extinguished. The non-settling defendant retains the legal right to pursue a separate, post-judgment action for contribution against the settling party.

Strategic Implications for Settling Defendants (Hospitals and Insurers)

For settling parties, achieving finality is typically the primary objective of entering into a settlement agreement. This decision underscores that executing a standard “Swigert release”—where liability is denied and pro rata reduction is conditioned on a future finding—does not guarantee immediate immunity from contribution claims in medical malpractice cases.

1. Admitting Joint Tort-Feasor Status: If absolute closure is the goal, a settling defendant must include an express admission or stipulation of joint tort-feasor status within the release text (as demonstrated in Jones v. Hurst). This automatically triggers a pro rata credit for non-settling defendants under Section 3-1405 and completely bars future contribution lawsuits.
2. Indemnification and Escrow Provisions: If a settling defendant refuses to admit fault, it must rely on indemnification clauses and escrow arrangements, as the hospital did in this case. However, this shifts the financial exposure back onto the plaintiff, who may have to refund portions of their recovery to defend or indemnify the settling party.

Tactical Options for Non-Settling Defendants

Non-settling co-defendants face complex strategic decisions when a co-defendant settles before trial:

• Choice of Forum for Contribution: Non-settling parties do not have to cross-claim or keep a settling defendant in the original lawsuit.
• Trial Strategy Considerations: As noted in the proceedings, non-settling defendants often choose not to cross-claim against a settling co-defendant during the main trial. Keeping a settling medical provider in front of the jury can create confusion or force the remaining defendant to split focus between defending itself and proving the co-defendant’s fault. Pursuing a post-judgment contribution action in a separate proceeding allows the non-settling party to focus purely on defending against the plaintiff first.

Drafting Tips for Plaintiff Attorneys

Attorneys representing plaintiffs must evaluate the true net value of any partial settlement:

• Evaluate Indemnity Risk: When executing a conditional release that does not provide joint tort-feasor status, plaintiffs must understand that they may be back in post-trial litigation via indemnity obligations.
• Escrow Holdbacks: As shown in this litigation, plaintiffs may have significant portions of their recovery tied up in escrow accounts pending the outcome of secondary contribution claims. Clear language regarding the scope and timeline of indemnity obligations is needed to avoid prolonged financial uncertainty.

Summary of Statutory Requirements

Conclusion on Contribution in Medical Malpractice

This opinion reinforced that conditional release agreements cannot easily bypass statutory contribution rights under Maryland law.

Unless a settling party admits joint tort-feasor status or the court adjudicates it liable, non-settling defendants who pay more than their pro rata share in a medical malpractice case retain the right to seek contribution in a separate proceeding.

Attorneys drafting settlement agreements in multi-party litigation must carefully balance the desire to deny liability against the need to achieve complete protection from future contribution claims.

You can read additional Blog posts on issues involving Settlement and Judgments, including:

• Joint Tortfeasors: Scott v. Universal 1
• Entry of Judgment: Scott v. Universal 2
• Release & Wrongful Death: Spangler v. McQuitty 2

Mark Kopec is a top-rated Baltimore medical malpractice lawyer. Contact us at 800-604-0704 to speak directly with Attorney Kopec in a free consultation. The Kopec Law Firm is in Baltimore and helps clients throughout Maryland and Washington, D.C. Thank you for reading the Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer Blog.

Factual Background on Disputed Settlement

The background to the disputed settlement and hearing issue began when, on June 10, 2021, two spouses brought their 2007 car for repair. They took the vehicle to an auto shop in Camp Springs, Maryland. On June 21, a repair shop worker called the couple. The worker said the car would be ready soon. However, two hours later, the worker called again. She told them that the car was missing. The husband called the local police to report the missing car. Then, the couple met a police officer at the repair shop. The staff told them that thieves stole the car overnight.

On June 23, police officers in Virginia found the missing car. A tow yard in Woodbridge, Virginia had the vehicle. The car was chopped up. Many parts were missing or broken. An officer told the couple that the tow yard bought the car. The couple received a paper from the tow yard dated June 22, 2021. The paper named an agent of the tow yard as the buyer. It also named a car dealership as the seller. On July 2, workers brought the car back to the couple’s house.

The Lawsuit

The couple filed a court case on February 24, 2023. They filed the suit in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. The couple claimed trover and conversion, negligence and breach of contract (bailment), and conspiracy. They sued both the repair shop and the tow yard. The repair shop filed an answer to the suit. But the tow yard did not answer. Therefore, the court entered a default judgment against the tow yard for $100,991.41. This money included $20,991.41 in real loss and $80,000 in punitive damages.

Before trial, the repair shop filed motions to block certain facts. They wanted to block a bill of sale. They also wanted to block evidence of a transport contract. The couple had made that contract with their son.

A jury trial started on June 26, 2024. First, the court picked a jury. Next, the judge held a talk with the lawyers. During this talk, the judge granted the repair shop’s motions. The judge ruled that the bill of sale was unfair. He also ruled that the transport contract was uncertain. After this ruling, the lawyer for the couple asked for a short break.

The Issue of Disputed Settlement and Hearing

When the break ended, the lawyers returned to court. They told the judge that they reached a deal. The judge said he would dismiss the case under court rules. However, he did not ask for the terms in open court. At the same time, a second judge filed orders. Those orders actually denied the repair shop’s earlier motions. But the parties did not know this yet.

Soon after, the husband wrote letters to the judge. He asked for a meeting right away. He said his lawyer made the deal without his consent. Also, he said he never agreed to take $14,000. He said his lawyer pressed him to settle. Because of this dispute, the lawyer moved to step down.

Next, the husband filed papers on his own to reopen the case. He explained that he never gave his lawyer consent to settle. In addition, he said his lawyer dropped the demand from $20,000 to $14,000 without approval. He stated that he wanted to continue the jury trial. Nevertheless, the trial judge denied these requests without holding a hearing on the supposed settlement.

Later, the repair shop moved to enforce the deal. They asked for lawyer fees too. They filed a sworn statement from the former lawyer. The lawyer claimed he had full power to settle. The husband filed an answer to oppose the motion. He gave a sworn statement from his son as well. He repeated that he never gave verbal or written consent.

Trial Court’s Ruling

On November 27, 2024, the court granted the motion to enforce the deal. The judge did not hold a fact-finding hearing on the disputed settlement. He ordered the husband to sign the deal in five days. He also dismissed the case with prejudice. Finally, he ordered the husband to pay $1,665 in lawyer fees. The husband then filed a timely appeal.

Parties’ Arguments

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court made a mistake. He asserted that the court erred by enforcing the deal without a hearing. Furthermore, he argued that a full hearing was necessary under the law. He had filed sworn papers showing he never gave his lawyer power to settle. Thus, he argued that real factual disputes existed. The court needed to decide if a binding deal existed. The court also needed to check if the lawyer had express power to bind him.

In response, the defendant argued that the trial court acted correctly. The defendant claimed that the record showed a binding contract. Furthermore, the defendant asserted that the former lawyer had express authority to settle the claim. The defendant also argued that the statements in court proved mutual assent. They claimed the draft papers showed an intent to be bound.

Court’s Ruling on Hearing on Disputed Settlement

The appeals court ruled that the trial court made an error. The trial court should not have enforced the deal without holding a fact-finding hearing. So, the appeals court sent the case back for more steps. They did so without affirming or reversing the trial court judgment.

In its legal opinion, the appeals court explained the governing law. Settlement deals are contracts under Maryland law. However, a motion to enforce a settlement is not a routine request. When a lawyer settles a case, the party moving to enforce must prove two things. First, they must show that counsel acted with client power. Second, they must show that this power expressly covered the settlement.

Furthermore, the court stated clear rules for settlement disputes. When parties dispute the existence of a deal, the court must act. If they dispute the lawyer’s authority, a simple ruling is not enough. Instead, the trial court must hold a full fact-finding hearing to resolve the facts. A summary ruling is proper only when the material facts are clear and undisputed.

Applying these rules, the appeals court looked at the record. The record had no signed written agreement. Thus, the record showed at most an oral talk with unwritten terms. In addition, the plaintiff disputed the deal from the start. He filed sworn papers denying his lawyer’s power. Therefore, a major dispute of fact existed. The trial court could not resolve this dispute using only lawyer statements or cold papers. Instead, the court needed a formal hearing with witness testimony.

Because the court remanded the case, it did not address the second issue. It declined to rule on the award of lawyer fees.

Commentary by Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer Mark Kopec on Hearing on Disputed Settlement

Under basic contract rules, a lawyer cannot settle a lawsuit without clear power from the client. When a client files sworn papers stating that a lawyer settled a case without consent, a real dispute of fact exists. The trial court erred by enforcing an unwritten deal based only on cold court filings and conflicting lawyer talks. The law requires a trial court to resolve such factual disputes through a full fact-finding hearing. At this hearing, witnesses can testify under oath. Then, the court can check truthfulness before taking away a person’s day in court.

As a key practice tip, whenever lawyers settle a case in court, the lawyer should always ask to put the deal on the record in open court. The lawyer should do this with the client present in the courtroom. Placing the terms on the record while the client is present ensures that the client hears and accepts the deal. Counsel should ask the client on the record if they understand the terms. The lawyer should also ask if the client agrees to the settlement amount and gives power to settle. Doing so creates an official record that protects both the lawyer and the client. It also stops future disagreements and avoids motions to enforce or undo the deal. Hopefully, there will be no need for a hearing because there won’t be any disputed settlement.

You can read other Blog posts on the topic of Settlement, including Enforcing Settlement: Kolbe v. McKnew.

Mark Kopec is a top-rated Baltimore medical malpractice lawyer. Contact us at 800-604-0704 to speak directly with Attorney Kopec in a free consultation. The Kopec Law Firm is in Baltimore and helps clients throughout Maryland and Washington, D.C. Thank you for reading the Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer Blog.

Factual Background

The roots of this legal battle trace back to a birth Injury that occurred in 2004. The plaintiffs were a mother and child. They alleged that the medical care provided at the hospital was negligent. Specifically, they targeted two theories of liability. The direct negligence of the hospital’s nursing staff and the vicarious liability of the attending obstetrician.

The case in the Circuit Court for Harford County reached a twelve-day jury trial in July 2022. Separate counsel represented the hospital and doctor. They appeared to the outside world as co-defendants with aligned interests in defeating the plaintiffs’ claims. However, just after the court impaneled the jury, the plaintiffs’ counsel disclosed that they had struck a deal with the doctor.

The parties to the agreement did not disclose the terms of this deal to hospital or the trial judge at the start of the proceedings. The trial judge declined at that time to require disclosure of the terms. While the trial moved forward, the doctor remained a named defendant. He testified with a level of contrition that suggested he was “accepting responsibility”. It wasn’t until the third week of trial—after nearly all evidence had been presented—that the details of the “Agreement” was finally revealed. The jury eventually returned a verdict of $13,385,000 against the hospital.

Parties’ Arguments on Disclosure of Mary Carter Agreement

The core of the appeal centered on whether the trial was fundamentally unfair due to the secrecy of the agreement between the plaintiffs and the doctor.

The Hospital’s Position (Appellant)

The hospital argued that the deal was a “Mary Carter Agreement.” This is a controversial type of settlement where a defendant stays in the case but has their liability capped or eliminated in exchange for helping the plaintiff’s case against other defendants. The hospital contended that:

• The court should have dismissed the doctor from the case entirely once the parties had entered into the agreement.
• The late disclosure of the deal created a “sham of adversity,” where the jury was misled into thinking the doctor was a true adversary to the plaintiffs when he was actually cooperating with them.
• The delay prevented the hospital from effectively cross-examining the doctor about his motives or using an “empty chair” defense to shift blame away from the nurses.

The Plaintiffs’ Position (Appellees)

The plaintiffs fought to keep the verdict intact, arguing:

• The deal wasn’t a true Mary Carter Agreement because no money changed hands upfront.
• The trial judge eventually disclosed the agreement to the jury before they deliberated, which they argued cured any potential prejudice.
• The hospital was still directly liable for the nurses’ actions regardless of the doctor’s status.

Court Ruling on Disclosure of Mary Carter Agreement

The Appellate Court of Maryland ultimately sided with the hospital. It reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanding the case for a new hearing on the motion for mistrial.

Defining the Agreement

The court first confirmed that the deal was, in fact, a Mary Carter Agreement. The court found the doctor received a “pecuniary benefit” because the plaintiffs promised not to enforce any judgment against him. This created the very “sham of adversity” Maryland law seeks to avoid.

The Dismissal Issue

The court clarified that Maryland law does not automatically require a defendant who settles via a Mary Carter Agreement to be dismissed from the case. Therefore, the trial judge did not err by letting the doctor stay in the trial.

The Prejudicial Delay

The fatal error, according to the Appellate Court, was the timing of the disclosure. By allowing the trial to proceed for weeks without the jury knowing about the secret deal, the lower court allowed the doctor’s testimony to be viewed in a vacuum. The jury saw a “heroic figure” who was “taking full responsibility” without knowing he had zero financial risk.

The court noted that the hospital lost its chance to:

1. Color the doctor’s testimony by showing he had “nothing to lose”.
2. Properly execute an “empty chair” defense.

The court concluded that while there is no “bright line rule” on when these deals must be disclosed, in this specific case, the plaintiffs’ disclosure was far too late to save the fairness of the trial.

Commentary on Disclosure of Mary Carter Agreement

Mary Carter Agreements are not common. This opinion restates that the trial judge has discretion to require the terms be revealed to the jury, but the scope of that discretion is unclear.

Generally, abuse of discretion is a very high bar for an appellant to clear. It requires showing that the trial judge’s decision was “well removed from any center mark” or “violative of fact and logic.”

Although this opinion states that a trial judge “may” disclose the terms of a Mary Carter agreement, the discussion does not indicate if nondisclosure is ever within the discretion. In terms of timing of the disclosure, the appellate court said the end of evidence was too late but declined to set a bright line rule. The trial judge’s allowance of the parties to recall witnesses did not cure the lateness. What constitutes late in other cases is not clear.

Plaintiffs may want to push for the best of both worlds by having the agreement and declining or delaying in disclosing it. However this opinion is a cautionary tale that shows the risks of proceeding in that manner.

Mark Kopec is a top-rated Baltimore medical malpractice lawyer. Contact us at 800-604-0704 to speak directly with Attorney Kopec in a free consultation. The Kopec Law Firm is in Baltimore and helps clients throughout Maryland and Washington, D.C. Thank you for reading the Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer Blog.

Factual Background to the One Satisfaction Rule

​The appellate court noted that the plaintiff has an extensive and complex medical history. (Op. At 2).

In 2009, the plaintiff reported chronic myalgias and extreme fatigue affecting her shoulders, wrists, neck, thoracic area, hips, knees, and ankles. Doctors then diagnosed her with osteoporosis and degenerative spine disease.  (Id.).

In 2012, the plaintiff suffered a traumatic brain injury (“TBI”) when she fell down a flight of stairs, resulting in massive intracranial bleeding that left her cognitively and physically disabled. Following her TBI, the plaintiff suffered from vision problems, balance disturbances, and reduced strength. She required assistance with virtually all activities of daily living, was unable to walk without assistance, dress, or use the bathroom independently, and was found to be “disabled” by the Social Security Administration. (Id.).

This history preceded the events that gave rise to one satisfaction rule issue.

Alleged Medical Malpractice

​On July 19, 2017, the plaintiff visited the defendant hospital’s emergency department with complaints of ongoing and worsening low back pain. She denied any recent falls and denied incontinence. On examination, she had normal strength in her lower legs. She was diagnosed with nontraumatic back pain, and, after a few hours, she improved in the emergency department and was released to receive physical therapy at home. (Id.).

On July 31, 2017, a physician saw the plaintiff following complaints of back pain and urinary incontinence. An MRI revealed a “severe compression deformity” and “stenosis and disc protrusion” in her lumbar spine. The plaintiff visited a spine surgeon on August 4, 2017, who prescribed her a back brace that she refused to wear and scheduled her for spine repair surgery to be conducted ten days later. Before the surgery could take place, however, the plaintiff was discharged from the surgeon’s practice after her sister was abusive toward the office. (Id.).

On August 19, 2017, the plaintiff was evaluated at a different hospital’s emergency department for the onset of generalized weakness and told staff that she had been falling several times a day due to her weakness. The following day, she required immediate medical intervention as a result of severe, life-threatening, or potentially disabling conditions. She transferred to the Johns Hopkins emergency department, where they admitted her. (Id. at 3-4).

The plaintiff subsequently underwent spine surgery on August 23, 2017. While recovering after the surgery in her hospital room, she fell when she attempted to go to the bathroom. Her right hip was fractured as a result of this fall, and corrective surgery was performed the following day. (Id. at 4). This was the unsettled claim part of the one satisfaction rule in this case.

Medical Malpractice Claim

​The plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Frederick County on April 2, 2019, alleging medical malpractice during the July 19, 2017, emergency department visit. The plaintiffs’ complaint contended that the defendants’ negligent failure to diagnose contributed to the plaintiff’s development of cauda equina syndrome, conus medullaris syndrome, and permanent damages, including bowel and bladder incontinence, severe back and leg pain, numbness, and weakness. (Id. at 4-5).

The court twice postponed the trial until ultimately scheduling it for May 20, 2024. (Id. at 5).

Car Accident

​While awaiting the trial, on May 1, 2021, nearly four years after the alleged medical malpractice, the plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident resulting in multiple injuries, including a left hip fracture. She had left hip surgery on May 2, 2021. Her medical records documented both current problems and historical ones. (Id. at 5-6).

On November 17, 2022, the plaintiff filed a complaint concerning the car accident case. The plaintiff settled the suit for $100,000 and gave a release concerning the accident. (Id. at 6-7). This was the settled claim in the one satisfaction rule issue. The release did not mention or carve out exceptions for the plaintiff’s then-pending medical negligence suit or any other injuries before the May 1, 2021, motor vehicle accident. (Id. at 7).

The plaintiffs did not disclose the motor vehicle negligence proceedings or the release to their trial counsel in the medical negligence case. Counsel learned afterward of the release. (Id.).

The defense moved for summary judgment based on the release, and the court granted it under the one satisfaction rule. (Id. at 8). The plaintiffs appealed. (Id. at 9).

Appellate Court of Maryland on the One Satisfaction Rule

The one satisfaction rule states that there can be only one satisfaction for the same injury. The first step is to identify what constituted the plaintiff’s alleged satisfaction. Satisfaction is an acceptance of full compensation for an injury. In addition, the unresolved negligence must flow legitimately as a natural and probable consequence of the satisfied injury. (Id. at 13).

In the second step, the court decides whether the satisfaction from the first-resolved action encompassed all of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, including those injuries, in the subsequent proceeding, alleged to be attributable to the negligence in the second, unresolved action. (Id. at 14).

The alleged satisfaction here is the $100,000 payment that the plaintiff accepted in the motor vehicle negligence case. The Release was limited to injuries arising out of the car accident. This did not make the plaintiff whole for medical malpractice claims arising four years before the car accident. (Id. at 15-16).

In addition, the car accident case focused on the fracture of the left hip, while the medical malpractice case focused on matters that preceded the car accident: cauda equina syndrome, conus medullaris syndrome, and permanent damage, including bowel and bladder incontinence, severe back and leg pain, numbness, and weakness.

Because the motor vehicle negligence release did not represent a satisfaction of the plaintiff’s medical negligence claims, the Appellate Court held that the one satisfaction rule does not bar the medical negligence action from proceeding. (Id. at 19).

Commentary By Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer Mark Kopec on the One Satisfaction Rule

​The analysis of the one-satisfaction rule in this case is straightforward. The medical malpractice did not flow from the car accident injury. It preceded it.  (Unlike a situation where a car accident caused injury, and during treatment for the injury, the plaintiff was harmed by medical malpractice. See Blog post, One Satisfaction: Gallagher v. Mercy)

Moreover, the plaintiff got separate injuries in the two events. The medical malpractice allegedly resulted in incontinence and pain in the lower back. The car accident resulted in a broken left hip.

There is no reasonable analysis that could conclude that the car accident settlement compensated the plaintiff for the medical malpractice injuries.

Practical Considerations

In the context of releases, I’ve previously written in this Blog about the importance of medical malpractice and car accident lawyers coordinating their efforts to ensure that their claims do not interfere with each other’s. In this case, no one told the medical malpractice lawyer about the car accident, the injury, the claim, or the settlement until afterward. That should not happen.

The bigger concern for the plaintiff in this case should not be the one satisfaction rule or the car accident injury. Rather, it is her prior history of disabling medical conditions. There is no question that the incontinence caused by cauda equina syndrome and conus medullaris syndrome is a horrible thing to have to live with. On remand, however, the defense will emphasize how difficult the plaintiff’s daily life was for years before the alleged medical malpractice occurred.

You can read other Blog posts on cases involving Damages and Settlement issues.

Mark Kopec is a top-rated Baltimore medical malpractice lawyer. Contact us at 800-604-0704 to speak directly with Attorney Kopec in a free consultation. The Kopec Law Firm is in Baltimore and helps clients throughout Maryland and Washington, D.C. Thank you for reading the Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer Blog.

Factual Background

​This case involved a car collision, and the plaintiff filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. The plaintiffs included a woman and her two minor children. (Op. at 2).

​Before trial, counsel for the defendants sent a settlement offer to counsel for the plaintiffs via email. It stated, “I have final authority of $30k/each for the kids for a total of $160k.” Counsel for the plaintiff made a counteroffer stating, “I am at $175,000,” and asked whether the insurance company would make it a “global settlement.” According to counsel for the defendant, he orally accepted that offer during a phone call with opposing counsel. Subsequently, per counsel for the defense, counsel for the plaintiff attempted to raise the settlement demand to $300,000 on the same phone call. Counsel for the defense later filed a motion enforcing the $175,000 settlement. (Id. at 3). Defense counsel also asserted that the plaintiff lawyer’s statement that he “meant to withdraw the offer during the phone call but had not done so” indicated a settlement. (Id. at 4).

​In response to the motion enforcing settlement, counsel for the plaintiffs did not dispute whether the phone call took place or whether counsel for the defense accepted the settlement demand for $175,000. Instead, counsel asserted that he withdrew the $175,000 settlement offer “at the same time” that counsel for the defense accepted. Per counsel for the plaintiff, there was no settlement, and negotiations remained ongoing.  (Id.)

​The circuit court granted the defense’s motion to enforce the settlement without holding a hearing. The plaintiffs appealed. (Id.).

Appellate Court on Enforcing a Settlement Agreement

The Appellate Court stated that it is often extremely difficult to determine the factual question of whether the parties intended to create an executory accord, where one party pays the other to dismiss claims. Such an agreement need not be in writing. Oral executory agreements are binding and may be enforced as long as the basic requirements for a contract are present. Where the existence of a settlement agreement is contested, a full plenary hearing is required. That an agreement to settle exists between the parties must be proven based on facts in the record and not solely on the allegations of counsel. (Id. at 5-6).

The Appellate Court held that the trial court erred because a full plenary hearing was required before issuing a ruling on the motion to enforce the settlement. The trial court granted the defense’s motion to enforce the settlement without any evidence that the parties had agreed to settle the case, even though the parties disputed the existence of any such agreement. There was no sworn testimony, affidavits, depositions, interrogatories, or anything remotely resembling evidence adduced at the motion hearing to prove the existence of an agreement between the parties. The trial court granted the defense’s motion to enforce the settlement solely based on the representations made by counsel in their pleadings. This was an error, and the Appellate Court reversed. (Id. at 6-7).

Commentary by Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer Mark Kopec on Enforcing a Settlement Agreement

​The trial court in this case failed to take evidence on whether there was a settlement. The facts in this case are quite unusual. The trial court may have heard that the plaintiff’s lawyer admitted they failed to withdraw the offer and perhaps concluded that, legally, there was no dispute of fact. However, the Appellate Court made clear in this opinion that the trial court still has to take evidence.

Representations by counsel in pleadings are not enough, even when the evidence is going to be the same in sworn form. The evidence on whether there was a settlement was composed of communications between the lawyers.

Moreover, it is a very unusual situation for a plaintiff’s lawyer to attempt to withdraw a demand and then replace it with one that is almost twice as much. The opinion does not discuss any facts that shed light on what led to the move.

On remand, the parties will have an opportunity to present evidence regarding the existence or nonexistence of a settlement. In addition, the plaintiff should consider explaining the rationale for the attempt almost to double their settlement demand. Without a supportive explanation, it is hard to see a judge being sympathetic to such a move.

Practice point

​In mediations, the mediator serves as a neutral witness to any settlement reached. When lawyers negotiate directly with each other, however, they should plan the communication and document it in the event one side contests with a motion enforcing settlement. Email is a good choice.

​However, it is best not to mix and match. In this case, it appears that plaintiff’s counsel sent an email demand and then followed up with a phone call intended to replace it. The risk is obvious – the opposing lawyer may accept the prior demand before it is replaced. That may be what happened here. The preferred practice is to communicate the replacement demand by email.

You can read other Blog posts involving settlement issues.

Mark Kopec is a top-rated Baltimore medical malpractice lawyer. Contact us at 800-604-0704 to speak directly with Attorney Kopec in a free consultation. The Kopec Law Firm is in Baltimore and helps clients throughout Maryland and Washington, D.C. Thank you for reading the Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer Blog.

Factual Background

The plaintiffs had previously brought a birth injury case on behalf of their son against the mother’s OB/GYN and practice group for failure to obtain informed consent for treatment during pregnancy. As a result, the mother had a placental abruption, which caused their son to have cerebral palsy. (Op. at 2). Another OB/GYN in the group and a hospital were also defendants, but they settled. The plaintiffs then obtained a judgment against the defendants in excess of $5 million, which the defendants paid. (Id. at 2-4).

Afterward, the minor died. The minor’s parents then filed wrongful death claims in a new lawsuit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. The defense moved to dismiss the case, and the circuit court granted the motion. (Id. at 4-5). The Court of Special Appeals reversed. The defense then appealed. (Id. at 7-9). 

Court of Appeals on Release and Subsequent Wrongful Death Action

Firstly, the CA addressed the defendant’s argument that the plaintiffs could not pursue the wrongful death claims. You can read about that ruling here: Wrongful Act: Spangler v. McQuitty 1

The court then examined the issue of whether a decedent’s release of one joint tort-feasor in a personal injury action for any future claims in connection with the tortious conduct also precludes the decedent’s beneficiaries from pursuing a wrongful death action against all joint tort-feasors based on the same underlying facts. (Id. at 1).

The release was a covenant between the decedent and the settling OB/GYN. It specifically revealed an intent to release only him. As a result, the release does not bar the plaintiff’s wrongful death action against the defendants. (Id. at 36).

Paragraph 8 of the release provided:

That, in consideration of the monies paid, Plaintiff covenants that wrongful death primary beneficiaries and secondary beneficiaries, known and unknown will not maintain any potential action for wrongful death, which stems from the subject matter of The Lawsuit. Plaintiff covenants that his heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns will not maintain any potential action for survival to include, but not necessarily limited to, funeral expenses. (Id. at 40).

The defendants argued that this paragraph barred “any” wrongful death claim “known and unknown”, not just one against the settling OB/GYN.

Holding

The CA noted:

“Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-1404 provides: A release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor, whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other tort-feasors unless the release so provides, but it reduces the claim against the other tort-feasors in the amount of the consideration paid for the release or in any amount or proportion by which the release provides that the total claim shall be reduced, if greater than the consideration paid.” (emphasis added). (Id. at 36-37).

The CA rejected the defendants’ argument as based on an isolated portion of the release. Reading the provisions together demonstrates that the decedent did not release the parties who are defendants in this case, or all tort-feasors. (Id. at 38, 40).

The court specifically held that pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-1404, a release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor, whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other tort-feasors unless the release so provides. Thus, where the language of a release unambiguously reveals an intent to release only one joint tort-feasor, the release does not preclude a subsequent wrongful death action against other tort-feasors that were not parties to the release. (Id. at 1-2).

Commentary by Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer Mark Kopec on Release and Subsequent Wrongful Death Action

This opinion is an important case under Maryland release law. The CA emphasizes that it will not take release provisions out of context. Even though the release in paragraph 8 did not specify a party, the overall provisions of the release made it clear that the recipient was the party that settled, and not the joint tort-feasors who would become defendants in the wrongful death case. This ruling has significant implications for medical malpractice claims, as it clarifies the interpretation of release provisions in such cases.

You can read other posts on issues involving joint tortfeasors in the settlement category.

Mark Kopec is a top-rated Baltimore medical malpractice lawyer. Contact us at 800-604-0704 to speak directly with Attorney Kopec in a free consultation. The Kopec Law Firm is in Baltimore and helps clients throughout Maryland and Washington, D.C. Thank you for reading the Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer Blog.

Factual Background

The plaintiff suffered injuries in a car accident in January 2009. (Op. at 1).  She then underwent two reconstructive breast surgeries in April of 2011 and October of 2012. In the month following the second surgery, the plaintiff developed an infection. When the medical provider inserted a PICC line to administer antibiotics, it damaged her brachial artery. The plaintiff had surgery to repair the artery and developed Reflex Sympathetic Dystrophy in her arm. (Id. at 2).

The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the other driver and her own insurer for underinsurance coverage. (Id. at 2). In April and May of 2012, the plaintiff settled her claim against the driver. The driver paid $25,000, which was the full policy amount. The plaintiff provided a release to the driver that reserved her claim against her own insurer but did not mention the hospital. The plaintiff filed a dismissal with prejudice of her claim against the driver. (Id. at 3).

The plaintiff’s claim proceeded against her insurer. The damages that she sought would be important to the one satisfaction rule. In discovery responses, the plaintiff stated that she was seeking damages relating to both surgeries, the infection that followed, and the permanent arm injury that resulted. The plaintiff had expert witnesses testify to the causal connection between the breast surgeries and the car accident. (Id. at 4). 

As part of a discovery dispute, the trial court excluded some of the plaintiff’s medical bills from the PICC line procedure because they were produced too late. During the trial in January 2015, the parties settled the underinsurance claim for $125,000, which they dismissed with prejudice. (Id. at 5).

Medical Malpractice Lawsuit

In November 2015, the plaintiff filed a medical malpractice case against the hospital that had treated her. HCADRO transferred the case to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. She claimed damages relating to the PICC line procedure. (Id. at 5-6).

Application of One Satisfaction Rule

The hospital filed a motion for summary judgment based on the one-satisfaction rule. The circuit court found that the damages the plaintiff sought were the same as she accepted in settlements in the car accident case. The court granted the motion for summary judgment. (Id. at 6-7).

The plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals. (Id. at 7).

Court of Appeals

A negligent driver can be liable for additional harm when others render aid, regardless of their negligence. There can be situations where a driver and subsequent doctor can both be liable for the same damage. However, where multiple people are responsible for harm, the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for her injuries. (Id. at 8).

The one satisfaction rule establishes that a plaintiff is entitled to one compensation for their loss, and satisfaction of the plaintiff’s claim prevents the plaintiff from pursuing another who may be liable for the same damages. (Id.). It is an equitable rule to prevent double recovery for the same injuries. (Id. at 9).

Satisfaction is an acceptance of full compensation for an injury. Once a plaintiff obtains total satisfaction, she cannot pursue another who may be liable for the same damages. (Id. at 9-10).

To assess the application of the one satisfaction rule, the court must compare the injuries for which the plaintiff received compensation in her first action and the injuries for which the plaintiff seeks compensation in the subsequent action. The court examines various materials from the earlier action, such as the complaint, the settlement agreement, and any expert reports, to make this determination. This process ensures the plaintiff does not receive double recovery for the same injuries. 

Application of the Rule

The plaintiff argued that the one satisfaction rule only applies when a defendant in the first suit pays a judgment in full. The court found that prior cases contradicted this argument. (Id. at 13-14).

The litigation between the plaintiff and the insurer encompassed years, and voluminous materials were available to the circuit court to assess the application of the rule. The court also had many materials from the medical malpractice case. There was no dispute about what the materials showed. (Id. at 14-15). The court found that these materials showed that the plaintiff’s settlement with the insurer covered all of the injuries that the plaintiff later sought in the medical malpractice suit. (Id. at 15-16).

The plaintiff argued that the settlement with her insurer did not constitute a full satisfaction of all of her injuries. She specifically relies on the court’s exclusion of some PICC line medical bills. She also says there was no total satisfaction because she compromised her claim for far less than she sought. (Id. at 17). The court rejected these assertions. The plaintiff voluntarily settled her first action, and the court would not revisit the value received. (Id. at 18). The court upheld the summary judgment. (Id. at 19).

Commentary by the Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer on the One Satisfaction Rule

The one satisfaction rule, while straightforward in its statement, can be a labyrinth of complexities to navigate. The unique situation in this case, where a car accident victim becomes a victim of medical malpractice, is a scenario that arises from time to time, demanding a meticulous understanding of the rule.

The analysis of what damages to seek in each case can be complex. It can depend on the strengths and weaknesses of claims and defenses and the amounts of insurance available, among other factors.

It can be particularly challenging for a medical malpractice lawyer who did not handle the car accident case. In such a scenario, seamless coordination with the car accident lawyer becomes crucial to ensure there are no overlapping claims for medical malpractice damages. Even if the car accident lawsuit has concluded, the medical malpractice lawyer must meticulously review the file to determine its impact on the one satisfaction rule.

In this case, where the same law firm handled both cases, the plaintiff, following the Court of Appeals decision, sued her own law firm. This case serves as a stark reminder and a cautionary tale for medical malpractice lawyers, underlining the need for vigilance and foresight in their legal practice.

Mark Kopec is a top-rated Baltimore medical malpractice lawyer. Contact us at 800-604-0704 to speak directly with Attorney Kopec in a free consultation. The Kopec Law Firm is in Baltimore and helps clients throughout Maryland and Washington, D.C. Thank you for reading the Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer Blog.

The plaintiff sued four entities in the Circuit Court for Howard County, alleging them to be the owner of the mall where the fall occurred, the manager of the mall, the janitorial contractor, and the security company. (Op. at 1). Afterward, the security company filed a crossclaim against the other three defendants, seeking indemnification and contribution if the jury found it was liable. (Id. at 1-2).

Joint Tortfeasor Settlement Agreement

The plaintiff then entered a joint tortfeasor settlement agreement with the owner, manager, and janitor. The janitor paid $190,000, and the manager and owner together contributed $190,000 for a total of $380,000. (Id. at 2).

The plaintiff and security subsequently went to trial, and the jury returned a verdict of $750,000 in favor of the plaintiff. (Id. at 4).

The plaintiff asserted three joint tortfeasors, but security argued that there were four. The circuit court held that there were four and entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff against security in the amount of $187,500. (Id.).

The number of joint tortfeasors depended on whether the owner and manager were considered one or two. (Id. at 5). The owner and manager agreed to pay $190,000 together, but the settlement agreement did not specify how much each would contribute. The release recited that each releasee was a joint tortfeasor, but also said that the manager and owner would be considered one tortfeasor. The Court interpreted these provisions as meaning that the parties to the release intended the owner to be a separate joint tortfeasor for purposes of contributing to the settlement but not for purposes of security’s contribution. (Id. at 5-6).

Appellate Court

The plaintiff argued that the owner and manager were one tortfeasor because they had a principal/agent relationship, and one party’s liability was derivative of the other’s. The plaintiff added that the two entities had shared one lawyer, filed joint papers, and issued one check for settlement. (Id. at 6).

The Court, however, observed that the plaintiff’s complaint contradicted their argument. The complaint alleged that the owner and manager separately maintained exclusive control over the premises and did not allege any agency relationship. The owner and manager had different duties. The manager was to inform the owner of problems, and the owner was to fix them. (Id. at 7). Despite those parties’ decision to cooperate in their defense, that did not put them into an agency relationship. (Id. at 7-8).

Commentary By the Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer

The joint tortfeasors issue can arise in Maryland medical malpractice cases whenever there is a partial settlement. For example, a plaintiff may sue a hospital and doctors’ groups. (We usually do not sue a doctor individually if an agency with a corporate defendant is established and there is no issue with insurance.)

A plaintiff’s lawyer should specifically be careful with allegations in a multi-defendant lawsuit and in the release language in a partial settlement. The lawyer should also analyze the relationships between defendants. All of these can affect the determination of joint tortfeasor status. Knowing the number of joint tortfeasors is essential to understanding how the court may reduce any judgment against a non-settling party.

Mark Kopec is a top-rated Baltimore medical malpractice lawyer. Contact us at 800-604-0704 to speak directly with Attorney Kopec in a free consultation. The Kopec Law Firm is in Baltimore and helps clients throughout Maryland and Washington, D.C. Thank you for reading the Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer Blog.