Factual Background

The roots of this legal battle trace back to a birth Injury that occurred in 2004. The plaintiffs were a mother and child. They alleged that the medical care provided at the hospital was negligent. Specifically, they targeted two theories of liability. The direct negligence of the hospital’s nursing staff and the vicarious liability of the attending obstetrician.

The case in the Circuit Court for Harford County reached a twelve-day jury trial in July 2022. Separate counsel represented the hospital and doctor. They appeared to the outside world as co-defendants with aligned interests in defeating the plaintiffs’ claims. However, just after the court impaneled the jury, the plaintiffs’ counsel disclosed that they had struck a deal with the doctor.

The parties to the agreement did not disclose the terms of this deal to hospital or the trial judge at the start of the proceedings. The trial judge declined at that time to require disclosure of the terms. While the trial moved forward, the doctor remained a named defendant. He testified with a level of contrition that suggested he was “accepting responsibility”. It wasn’t until the third week of trial—after nearly all evidence had been presented—that the details of the “Agreement” was finally revealed. The jury eventually returned a verdict of $13,385,000 against the hospital.

Parties’ Arguments on Disclosure of Mary Carter Agreement

The core of the appeal centered on whether the trial was fundamentally unfair due to the secrecy of the agreement between the plaintiffs and the doctor.

The Hospital’s Position (Appellant)

The hospital argued that the deal was a “Mary Carter Agreement.” This is a controversial type of settlement where a defendant stays in the case but has their liability capped or eliminated in exchange for helping the plaintiff’s case against other defendants. The hospital contended that:

• The court should have dismissed the doctor from the case entirely once the parties had entered into the agreement.
• The late disclosure of the deal created a “sham of adversity,” where the jury was misled into thinking the doctor was a true adversary to the plaintiffs when he was actually cooperating with them.
• The delay prevented the hospital from effectively cross-examining the doctor about his motives or using an “empty chair” defense to shift blame away from the nurses.

The Plaintiffs’ Position (Appellees)

The plaintiffs fought to keep the verdict intact, arguing:

• The deal wasn’t a true Mary Carter Agreement because no money changed hands upfront.
• The trial judge eventually disclosed the agreement to the jury before they deliberated, which they argued cured any potential prejudice.
• The hospital was still directly liable for the nurses’ actions regardless of the doctor’s status.

Court Ruling on Disclosure of Mary Carter Agreement

The Appellate Court of Maryland ultimately sided with the hospital. It reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanding the case for a new hearing on the motion for mistrial.

Defining the Agreement

The court first confirmed that the deal was, in fact, a Mary Carter Agreement. The court found the doctor received a “pecuniary benefit” because the plaintiffs promised not to enforce any judgment against him. This created the very “sham of adversity” Maryland law seeks to avoid.

The Dismissal Issue

The court clarified that Maryland law does not automatically require a defendant who settles via a Mary Carter Agreement to be dismissed from the case. Therefore, the trial judge did not err by letting the doctor stay in the trial.

The Prejudicial Delay

The fatal error, according to the Appellate Court, was the timing of the disclosure. By allowing the trial to proceed for weeks without the jury knowing about the secret deal, the lower court allowed the doctor’s testimony to be viewed in a vacuum. The jury saw a “heroic figure” who was “taking full responsibility” without knowing he had zero financial risk.

The court noted that the hospital lost its chance to:

1. Color the doctor’s testimony by showing he had “nothing to lose”.
2. Properly execute an “empty chair” defense.

The court concluded that while there is no “bright line rule” on when these deals must be disclosed, in this specific case, the plaintiffs’ disclosure was far too late to save the fairness of the trial.

Commentary on Disclosure of Mary Carter Agreement

Mary Carter Agreements are not common. This opinion restates that the trial judge has discretion to require the terms be revealed to the jury, but the scope of that discretion is unclear.

Generally, abuse of discretion is a very high bar for an appellant to clear. It requires showing that the trial judge’s decision was “well removed from any center mark” or “violative of fact and logic.”

Although this opinion states that a trial judge “may” disclose the terms of a Mary Carter agreement, the discussion does not indicate if nondisclosure is ever within the discretion. In terms of timing of the disclosure, the appellate court said the end of evidence was too late but declined to set a bright line rule. The trial judge’s allowance of the parties to recall witnesses did not cure the lateness. What constitutes late in other cases is not clear.

Plaintiffs may want to push for the best of both worlds by having the agreement and declining or delaying in disclosing it. However this opinion is a cautionary tale that shows the risks of proceeding in that manner.

Mark Kopec is a top-rated Baltimore medical malpractice lawyer. Contact us at 800-604-0704 to speak directly with Attorney Kopec in a free consultation. The Kopec Law Firm is in Baltimore and helps clients throughout Maryland and Washington, D.C. Thank you for reading the Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer Blog.

Factual Background to the One Satisfaction Rule

​The appellate court noted that the plaintiff has an extensive and complex medical history. (Op. At 2).

In 2009, the plaintiff reported chronic myalgias and extreme fatigue affecting her shoulders, wrists, neck, thoracic area, hips, knees, and ankles. Doctors then diagnosed her with osteoporosis and degenerative spine disease.  (Id.).

In 2012, the plaintiff suffered a traumatic brain injury (“TBI”) when she fell down a flight of stairs, resulting in massive intracranial bleeding that left her cognitively and physically disabled. Following her TBI, the plaintiff suffered from vision problems, balance disturbances, and reduced strength. She required assistance with virtually all activities of daily living, was unable to walk without assistance, dress, or use the bathroom independently, and was found to be “disabled” by the Social Security Administration. (Id.).

This history preceded the events that gave rise to one satisfaction rule issue.

Alleged Medical Malpractice

​On July 19, 2017, the plaintiff visited the defendant hospital’s emergency department with complaints of ongoing and worsening low back pain. She denied any recent falls and denied incontinence. On examination, she had normal strength in her lower legs. She was diagnosed with nontraumatic back pain, and, after a few hours, she improved in the emergency department and was released to receive physical therapy at home. (Id.).

On July 31, 2017, a physician saw the plaintiff following complaints of back pain and urinary incontinence. An MRI revealed a “severe compression deformity” and “stenosis and disc protrusion” in her lumbar spine. The plaintiff visited a spine surgeon on August 4, 2017, who prescribed her a back brace that she refused to wear and scheduled her for spine repair surgery to be conducted ten days later. Before the surgery could take place, however, the plaintiff was discharged from the surgeon’s practice after her sister was abusive toward the office. (Id.).

On August 19, 2017, the plaintiff was evaluated at a different hospital’s emergency department for the onset of generalized weakness and told staff that she had been falling several times a day due to her weakness. The following day, she required immediate medical intervention as a result of severe, life-threatening, or potentially disabling conditions. She transferred to the Johns Hopkins emergency department, where they admitted her. (Id. at 3-4).

The plaintiff subsequently underwent spine surgery on August 23, 2017. While recovering after the surgery in her hospital room, she fell when she attempted to go to the bathroom. Her right hip was fractured as a result of this fall, and corrective surgery was performed the following day. (Id. at 4). This was the unsettled claim part of the one satisfaction rule in this case.

Medical Malpractice Claim

​The plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Frederick County on April 2, 2019, alleging medical malpractice during the July 19, 2017, emergency department visit. The plaintiffs’ complaint contended that the defendants’ negligent failure to diagnose contributed to the plaintiff’s development of cauda equina syndrome, conus medullaris syndrome, and permanent damages, including bowel and bladder incontinence, severe back and leg pain, numbness, and weakness. (Id. at 4-5).

The court twice postponed the trial until ultimately scheduling it for May 20, 2024. (Id. at 5).

Car Accident

​While awaiting the trial, on May 1, 2021, nearly four years after the alleged medical malpractice, the plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident resulting in multiple injuries, including a left hip fracture. She had left hip surgery on May 2, 2021. Her medical records documented both current problems and historical ones. (Id. at 5-6).

On November 17, 2022, the plaintiff filed a complaint concerning the car accident case. The plaintiff settled the suit for $100,000 and gave a release concerning the accident. (Id. at 6-7). This was the settled claim in the one satisfaction rule issue. The release did not mention or carve out exceptions for the plaintiff’s then-pending medical negligence suit or any other injuries before the May 1, 2021, motor vehicle accident. (Id. at 7).

The plaintiffs did not disclose the motor vehicle negligence proceedings or the release to their trial counsel in the medical negligence case. Counsel learned afterward of the release. (Id.).

The defense moved for summary judgment based on the release, and the court granted it under the one satisfaction rule. (Id. at 8). The plaintiffs appealed. (Id. at 9).

Appellate Court of Maryland on the One Satisfaction Rule

The one satisfaction rule states that there can be only one satisfaction for the same injury. The first step is to identify what constituted the plaintiff’s alleged satisfaction. Satisfaction is an acceptance of full compensation for an injury. In addition, the unresolved negligence must flow legitimately as a natural and probable consequence of the satisfied injury. (Id. at 13).

In the second step, the court decides whether the satisfaction from the first-resolved action encompassed all of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, including those injuries, in the subsequent proceeding, alleged to be attributable to the negligence in the second, unresolved action. (Id. at 14).

The alleged satisfaction here is the $100,000 payment that the plaintiff accepted in the motor vehicle negligence case. The Release was limited to injuries arising out of the car accident. This did not make the plaintiff whole for medical malpractice claims arising four years before the car accident. (Id. at 15-16).

In addition, the car accident case focused on the fracture of the left hip, while the medical malpractice case focused on matters that preceded the car accident: cauda equina syndrome, conus medullaris syndrome, and permanent damage, including bowel and bladder incontinence, severe back and leg pain, numbness, and weakness.

Because the motor vehicle negligence release did not represent a satisfaction of the plaintiff’s medical negligence claims, the Appellate Court held that the one satisfaction rule does not bar the medical negligence action from proceeding. (Id. at 19).

Commentary By Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer Mark Kopec on the One Satisfaction Rule

​The analysis of the one-satisfaction rule in this case is straightforward. The medical malpractice did not flow from the car accident injury. It preceded it.  (Unlike a situation where a car accident caused injury, and during treatment for the injury, the plaintiff was harmed by medical malpractice. See Blog post, One Satisfaction: Gallagher v. Mercy)

Moreover, the plaintiff got separate injuries in the two events. The medical malpractice allegedly resulted in incontinence and pain in the lower back. The car accident resulted in a broken left hip.

There is no reasonable analysis that could conclude that the car accident settlement compensated the plaintiff for the medical malpractice injuries.

Practical Considerations

In the context of releases, I’ve previously written in this Blog about the importance of medical malpractice and car accident lawyers coordinating their efforts to ensure that their claims do not interfere with each other’s. In this case, no one told the medical malpractice lawyer about the car accident, the injury, the claim, or the settlement until afterward. That should not happen.

The bigger concern for the plaintiff in this case should not be the one satisfaction rule or the car accident injury. Rather, it is her prior history of disabling medical conditions. There is no question that the incontinence caused by cauda equina syndrome and conus medullaris syndrome is a horrible thing to have to live with. On remand, however, the defense will emphasize how difficult the plaintiff’s daily life was for years before the alleged medical malpractice occurred.

You can read other Blog posts on cases involving Damages and Settlement issues.

Mark Kopec is a top-rated Baltimore medical malpractice lawyer. Contact us at 800-604-0704 to speak directly with Attorney Kopec in a free consultation. The Kopec Law Firm is in Baltimore and helps clients throughout Maryland and Washington, D.C. Thank you for reading the Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer Blog.

Factual Background

​This case involved a car collision, and the plaintiff filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. The plaintiffs included a woman and her two minor children. (Op. at 2).

​Before trial, counsel for the defendants sent a settlement offer to counsel for the plaintiffs via email. It stated, “I have final authority of $30k/each for the kids for a total of $160k.” Counsel for the plaintiff made a counteroffer stating, “I am at $175,000,” and asked whether the insurance company would make it a “global settlement.” According to counsel for the defendant, he orally accepted that offer during a phone call with opposing counsel. Subsequently, per counsel for the defense, counsel for the plaintiff attempted to raise the settlement demand to $300,000 on the same phone call. Counsel for the defense later filed a motion enforcing the $175,000 settlement. (Id. at 3). Defense counsel also asserted that the plaintiff lawyer’s statement that he “meant to withdraw the offer during the phone call but had not done so” indicated a settlement. (Id. at 4).

​In response to the motion enforcing settlement, counsel for the plaintiffs did not dispute whether the phone call took place or whether counsel for the defense accepted the settlement demand for $175,000. Instead, counsel asserted that he withdrew the $175,000 settlement offer “at the same time” that counsel for the defense accepted. Per counsel for the plaintiff, there was no settlement, and negotiations remained ongoing.  (Id.)

​The circuit court granted the defense’s motion to enforce the settlement without holding a hearing. The plaintiffs appealed. (Id.).

Appellate Court on Enforcing a Settlement Agreement

The Appellate Court stated that it is often extremely difficult to determine the factual question of whether the parties intended to create an executory accord, where one party pays the other to dismiss claims. Such an agreement need not be in writing. Oral executory agreements are binding and may be enforced as long as the basic requirements for a contract are present. Where the existence of a settlement agreement is contested, a full plenary hearing is required. That an agreement to settle exists between the parties must be proven based on facts in the record and not solely on the allegations of counsel. (Id. at 5-6).

The Appellate Court held that the trial court erred because a full plenary hearing was required before issuing a ruling on the motion to enforce the settlement. The trial court granted the defense’s motion to enforce the settlement without any evidence that the parties had agreed to settle the case, even though the parties disputed the existence of any such agreement. There was no sworn testimony, affidavits, depositions, interrogatories, or anything remotely resembling evidence adduced at the motion hearing to prove the existence of an agreement between the parties. The trial court granted the defense’s motion to enforce the settlement solely based on the representations made by counsel in their pleadings. This was an error, and the Appellate Court reversed. (Id. at 6-7).

Commentary by Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer Mark Kopec on Enforcing a Settlement Agreement

​The trial court in this case failed to take evidence on whether there was a settlement. The facts in this case are quite unusual. The trial court may have heard that the plaintiff’s lawyer admitted they failed to withdraw the offer and perhaps concluded that, legally, there was no dispute of fact. However, the Appellate Court made clear in this opinion that the trial court still has to take evidence.

Representations by counsel in pleadings are not enough, even when the evidence is going to be the same in sworn form. The evidence on whether there was a settlement was composed of communications between the lawyers.

Moreover, it is a very unusual situation for a plaintiff’s lawyer to attempt to withdraw a demand and then replace it with one that is almost twice as much. The opinion does not discuss any facts that shed light on what led to the move.

On remand, the parties will have an opportunity to present evidence regarding the existence or nonexistence of a settlement. In addition, the plaintiff should consider explaining the rationale for the attempt almost to double their settlement demand. Without a supportive explanation, it is hard to see a judge being sympathetic to such a move.

Practice point

​In mediations, the mediator serves as a neutral witness to any settlement reached. When lawyers negotiate directly with each other, however, they should plan the communication and document it in the event one side contests with a motion enforcing settlement. Email is a good choice.

​However, it is best not to mix and match. In this case, it appears that plaintiff’s counsel sent an email demand and then followed up with a phone call intended to replace it. The risk is obvious – the opposing lawyer may accept the prior demand before it is replaced. That may be what happened here. The preferred practice is to communicate the replacement demand by email.

You can read other Blog posts involving settlement issues.

Mark Kopec is a top-rated Baltimore medical malpractice lawyer. Contact us at 800-604-0704 to speak directly with Attorney Kopec in a free consultation. The Kopec Law Firm is in Baltimore and helps clients throughout Maryland and Washington, D.C. Thank you for reading the Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer Blog.

Factual Background

The plaintiffs had previously brought a birth injury case on behalf of their son against the mother’s OB/GYN and practice group for failure to obtain informed consent for treatment during pregnancy. As a result, the mother had a placental abruption, which caused their son to have cerebral palsy. (Op. at 2). Another OB/GYN in the group and a hospital were also defendants, but they settled. The plaintiffs then obtained a judgment against the defendants in excess of $5 million, which the defendants paid. (Id. at 2-4).

Afterward, the minor died. The minor’s parents then filed wrongful death claims in a new lawsuit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. The defense moved to dismiss the case, and the circuit court granted the motion. (Id. at 4-5). The Court of Special Appeals reversed. The defense then appealed. (Id. at 7-9). 

Court of Appeals on Release and Subsequent Wrongful Death Action

Firstly, the CA addressed the defendant’s argument that the plaintiffs could not pursue the wrongful death claims. You can read about that ruling here: Wrongful Act: Spangler v. McQuitty 1

The court then examined the issue of whether a decedent’s release of one joint tort-feasor in a personal injury action for any future claims in connection with the tortious conduct also precludes the decedent’s beneficiaries from pursuing a wrongful death action against all joint tort-feasors based on the same underlying facts. (Id. at 1).

The release was a covenant between the decedent and the settling OB/GYN. It specifically revealed an intent to release only him. As a result, the release does not bar the plaintiff’s wrongful death action against the defendants. (Id. at 36).

Paragraph 8 of the release provided:

That, in consideration of the monies paid, Plaintiff covenants that wrongful death primary beneficiaries and secondary beneficiaries, known and unknown will not maintain any potential action for wrongful death, which stems from the subject matter of The Lawsuit. Plaintiff covenants that his heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns will not maintain any potential action for survival to include, but not necessarily limited to, funeral expenses. (Id. at 40).

The defendants argued that this paragraph barred “any” wrongful death claim “known and unknown”, not just one against the settling OB/GYN.

Holding

The CA noted:

“Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-1404 provides: A release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor, whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other tort-feasors unless the release so provides, but it reduces the claim against the other tort-feasors in the amount of the consideration paid for the release or in any amount or proportion by which the release provides that the total claim shall be reduced, if greater than the consideration paid.” (emphasis added). (Id. at 36-37).

The CA rejected the defendants’ argument as based on an isolated portion of the release. Reading the provisions together demonstrates that the decedent did not release the parties who are defendants in this case, or all tort-feasors. (Id. at 38, 40).

The court specifically held that pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-1404, a release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor, whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other tort-feasors unless the release so provides. Thus, where the language of a release unambiguously reveals an intent to release only one joint tort-feasor, the release does not preclude a subsequent wrongful death action against other tort-feasors that were not parties to the release. (Id. at 1-2).

Commentary by Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer Mark Kopec on Release and Subsequent Wrongful Death Action

This opinion is an important case under Maryland release law. The CA emphasizes that it will not take release provisions out of context. Even though the release in paragraph 8 did not specify a party, the overall provisions of the release made it clear that the recipient was the party that settled, and not the joint tort-feasors who would become defendants in the wrongful death case. This ruling has significant implications for medical malpractice claims, as it clarifies the interpretation of release provisions in such cases.

You can read other posts on issues involving joint tortfeasors in the settlement category.

Mark Kopec is a top-rated Baltimore medical malpractice lawyer. Contact us at 800-604-0704 to speak directly with Attorney Kopec in a free consultation. The Kopec Law Firm is in Baltimore and helps clients throughout Maryland and Washington, D.C. Thank you for reading the Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer Blog.

Factual Background

The plaintiff suffered injuries in a car accident in January 2009. (Op. at 1).  She then underwent two reconstructive breast surgeries in April of 2011 and October of 2012. In the month following the second surgery, the plaintiff developed an infection. When the medical provider inserted a PICC line to administer antibiotics, it damaged her brachial artery. The plaintiff had surgery to repair the artery and developed Reflex Sympathetic Dystrophy in her arm. (Id. at 2).

The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the other driver and her own insurer for underinsurance coverage. (Id. at 2). In April and May of 2012, the plaintiff settled her claim against the driver. The driver paid $25,000, which was the full policy amount. The plaintiff provided a release to the driver that reserved her claim against her own insurer but did not mention the hospital. The plaintiff filed a dismissal with prejudice of her claim against the driver. (Id. at 3).

The plaintiff’s claim proceeded against her insurer. The damages that she sought would be important to the one satisfaction rule. In discovery responses, the plaintiff stated that she was seeking damages relating to both surgeries, the infection that followed, and the permanent arm injury that resulted. The plaintiff had expert witnesses testify to the causal connection between the breast surgeries and the car accident. (Id. at 4). 

As part of a discovery dispute, the trial court excluded some of the plaintiff’s medical bills from the PICC line procedure because they were produced too late. During the trial in January 2015, the parties settled the underinsurance claim for $125,000, which they dismissed with prejudice. (Id. at 5).

Medical Malpractice Lawsuit

In November 2015, the plaintiff filed a medical malpractice case against the hospital that had treated her. HCADRO transferred the case to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. She claimed damages relating to the PICC line procedure. (Id. at 5-6).

Application of One Satisfaction Rule

The hospital filed a motion for summary judgment based on the one-satisfaction rule. The circuit court found that the damages the plaintiff sought were the same as she accepted in settlements in the car accident case. The court granted the motion for summary judgment. (Id. at 6-7).

The plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals. (Id. at 7).

Court of Appeals

A negligent driver can be liable for additional harm when others render aid, regardless of their negligence. There can be situations where a driver and subsequent doctor can both be liable for the same damage. However, where multiple people are responsible for harm, the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for her injuries. (Id. at 8).

The one satisfaction rule establishes that a plaintiff is entitled to one compensation for their loss, and satisfaction of the plaintiff’s claim prevents the plaintiff from pursuing another who may be liable for the same damages. (Id.). It is an equitable rule to prevent double recovery for the same injuries. (Id. at 9).

Satisfaction is an acceptance of full compensation for an injury. Once a plaintiff obtains total satisfaction, she cannot pursue another who may be liable for the same damages. (Id. at 9-10).

To assess the application of the one satisfaction rule, the court must compare the injuries for which the plaintiff received compensation in her first action and the injuries for which the plaintiff seeks compensation in the subsequent action. The court examines various materials from the earlier action, such as the complaint, the settlement agreement, and any expert reports, to make this determination. This process ensures the plaintiff does not receive double recovery for the same injuries. 

Application of the Rule

The plaintiff argued that the one satisfaction rule only applies when a defendant in the first suit pays a judgment in full. The court found that prior cases contradicted this argument. (Id. at 13-14).

The litigation between the plaintiff and the insurer encompassed years, and voluminous materials were available to the circuit court to assess the application of the rule. The court also had many materials from the medical malpractice case. There was no dispute about what the materials showed. (Id. at 14-15). The court found that these materials showed that the plaintiff’s settlement with the insurer covered all of the injuries that the plaintiff later sought in the medical malpractice suit. (Id. at 15-16).

The plaintiff argued that the settlement with her insurer did not constitute a full satisfaction of all of her injuries. She specifically relies on the court’s exclusion of some PICC line medical bills. She also says there was no total satisfaction because she compromised her claim for far less than she sought. (Id. at 17). The court rejected these assertions. The plaintiff voluntarily settled her first action, and the court would not revisit the value received. (Id. at 18). The court upheld the summary judgment. (Id. at 19).

Commentary by the Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer on the One Satisfaction Rule

The one satisfaction rule, while straightforward in its statement, can be a labyrinth of complexities to navigate. The unique situation in this case, where a car accident victim becomes a victim of medical malpractice, is a scenario that arises from time to time, demanding a meticulous understanding of the rule.

The analysis of what damages to seek in each case can be complex. It can depend on the strengths and weaknesses of claims and defenses and the amounts of insurance available, among other factors.

It can be particularly challenging for a medical malpractice lawyer who did not handle the car accident case. In such a scenario, seamless coordination with the car accident lawyer becomes crucial to ensure there are no overlapping claims for medical malpractice damages. Even if the car accident lawsuit has concluded, the medical malpractice lawyer must meticulously review the file to determine its impact on the one satisfaction rule.

In this case, where the same law firm handled both cases, the plaintiff, following the Court of Appeals decision, sued her own law firm. This case serves as a stark reminder and a cautionary tale for medical malpractice lawyers, underlining the need for vigilance and foresight in their legal practice.

Mark Kopec is a top-rated Baltimore medical malpractice lawyer. Contact us at 800-604-0704 to speak directly with Attorney Kopec in a free consultation. The Kopec Law Firm is in Baltimore and helps clients throughout Maryland and Washington, D.C. Thank you for reading the Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer Blog.

The plaintiff sued four entities in the Circuit Court for Howard County, alleging them to be the owner of the mall where the fall occurred, the manager of the mall, the janitorial contractor, and the security company. (Op. at 1). Afterward, the security company filed a crossclaim against the other three defendants, seeking indemnification and contribution if the jury found it was liable. (Id. at 1-2).

Joint Tortfeasor Settlement Agreement

The plaintiff then entered a joint tortfeasor settlement agreement with the owner, manager, and janitor. The janitor paid $190,000, and the manager and owner together contributed $190,000 for a total of $380,000. (Id. at 2).

The plaintiff and security subsequently went to trial, and the jury returned a verdict of $750,000 in favor of the plaintiff. (Id. at 4).

The plaintiff asserted three joint tortfeasors, but security argued that there were four. The circuit court held that there were four and entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff against security in the amount of $187,500. (Id.).

The number of joint tortfeasors depended on whether the owner and manager were considered one or two. (Id. at 5). The owner and manager agreed to pay $190,000 together, but the settlement agreement did not specify how much each would contribute. The release recited that each releasee was a joint tortfeasor, but also said that the manager and owner would be considered one tortfeasor. The Court interpreted these provisions as meaning that the parties to the release intended the owner to be a separate joint tortfeasor for purposes of contributing to the settlement but not for purposes of security’s contribution. (Id. at 5-6).

Appellate Court

The plaintiff argued that the owner and manager were one tortfeasor because they had a principal/agent relationship, and one party’s liability was derivative of the other’s. The plaintiff added that the two entities had shared one lawyer, filed joint papers, and issued one check for settlement. (Id. at 6).

The Court, however, observed that the plaintiff’s complaint contradicted their argument. The complaint alleged that the owner and manager separately maintained exclusive control over the premises and did not allege any agency relationship. The owner and manager had different duties. The manager was to inform the owner of problems, and the owner was to fix them. (Id. at 7). Despite those parties’ decision to cooperate in their defense, that did not put them into an agency relationship. (Id. at 7-8).

Commentary By the Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer

The joint tortfeasors issue can arise in Maryland medical malpractice cases whenever there is a partial settlement. For example, a plaintiff may sue a hospital and doctors’ groups. (We usually do not sue a doctor individually if an agency with a corporate defendant is established and there is no issue with insurance.)

A plaintiff’s lawyer should specifically be careful with allegations in a multi-defendant lawsuit and in the release language in a partial settlement. The lawyer should also analyze the relationships between defendants. All of these can affect the determination of joint tortfeasor status. Knowing the number of joint tortfeasors is essential to understanding how the court may reduce any judgment against a non-settling party.

Mark Kopec is a top-rated Baltimore medical malpractice lawyer. Contact us at 800-604-0704 to speak directly with Attorney Kopec in a free consultation. The Kopec Law Firm is in Baltimore and helps clients throughout Maryland and Washington, D.C. Thank you for reading the Baltimore Medical Malpractice Lawyer Blog.